





In an important late essay John Rawls acknowledges the development in
the Catholic Church’s attitude to politics.1 He recognizes elements of the
Catholic intellectual heritage and the contribution which it might make to
political discourse, relying on the notions of natural law, common good
and solidarity, as presented by authors drawing on that tradition. While
acknowledging the development that has taken place, Rawls also reminds
the reader of the problems that form the background to the emergence of
political liberalism.
A persecuting zeal has been the great curse of the Christian religion. It was
shared by Luther and Calvin and the Protestant Reformers, and it was not
radically changed in the Catholic Church until Vatican II. In the Council’s
Declaration on Religious Freedom – Dignitatis Humanae – the Catholic
Church committed itself to the principle of religious freedom as found in a
constitutional democratic regime. It declared the ethical doctrine of religious
freedom resting on the dignity of the human person; a political doctrine with
respect to the limits of government in religious matters; and a theological
doctrine of the freedom of the Church in its relations to the political and social
world. All persons, whatever their faith, have the right of religious liberty on the
same terms. y As John Courtney Murray, S.J., said: ‘A longstanding
ambiguity had ﬁnally been cleared up. The Church does not deal with the
secular order in terms of a double standard – freedom for the church when
Catholics are in the minority, privilege for the Church and intolerance for
others when Catholics are a majority.’2
The background to this acknowledgement has been an ongoing
conversation, conducted mostly in the United States of America, about
the role of religion in public life. In the literature of this conversation,
religious thinkers recognize that philosophical liberalism as it is found in
the American polity is hospitable to religion in public life, at least to the
extent of being tolerant.3 Finding themselves at home in the public space,
these thinkers investigate the appropriate role of religious language and
what religion has to contribute. Of course there is an acceptance of some
separation and some difference, so that the rules of participation in the
two spheres of religion and politics are different. Out of this literature has
r The Editor/Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK and Boston, USA.
HeyJ XLV (2004), pp. 178–196
emerged a mutual recognition and appreciation between signiﬁcant
thinkers in politics and religion. This literature is to be contrasted with the
theological discussions devoted to the critique of liberalism and especially
to the analysis of the deﬁciencies of liberalism as the culture of a political
system.4
The positive attitude expressed in Rawls’ essay on public reason
towards reasonable religious comprehensive doctrines in general and
towards Catholicism in particular is in marked contrast to a long
tradition of suspicion and exclusion. This tradition goes back to Hobbes
who devoted two of the four sections of Leviathan to the discussion of the
kind of religion which could be tolerated within the commonwealth, and
the kind of religion which would have to be censured. Hobbes was
particularly concerned to exclude the Catholic Church from those who
might be licensed by the sovereign. It posed a special threat to the security
and stability of the commonwealth, because it claimed for itself an
authority superior to that of the sovereign.5 Such a claim to a superior
authority was incompatible with Hobbes’ understanding of the role of the
sovereign, who guaranteed peace and security in the state precisely
because it held a monopoly of all authoritative power.
Although he provided a very different account of the nature and limits
of political power, John Locke also expressed concerns about the dangers
of unrestricted religious expression.6 For instance, among the categories
of people who could not be tolerated as citizens of the political
communities in which rights would be secured by limited government
he included Catholics and Muslims. Catholics ought not to be tolerated,
Locke thought, because in a position of power, perhaps being a majority
in a democracy, they themselves would not be tolerant of the religious
views of others. Their performance in history as well as their espoused
doctrine conﬁrmed this expectation.Muslims, on the other hand, believed
by Locke to owe allegiance to a foreign prince, the Mufti of Istanbul,
could not be tolerated as fellow citizens engaged in rule of the polity on a
basis of equality. The same argument was also used against Catholicism,
which was accused of owing allegiance to the Pope, a foreign prince.
The suspicion of religion in liberal political thought is linked also to the
Enlightenment expectation that the liberation of reason from the shackles
of myth, superstition and authority would lead to human progress in all
areas, including political existence. The belief that reason is the key to
eliminating ignorance, error, oppression, injustice, poverty, and the
myriad other evils which plague human existence survives in various
forms. Continued reliance by religious believers on authority, whether the
authority of the sacred text (Bible, Koran), of religious leaders and
ordained ministers, or the authority of personal faith experience, is seen
to frustrate this hope.
Liberal fears of religion have been reawakened by recent develop-
ments. The religious origins of various types of terrorism, the emergence
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of fundamentalism with its political ambitions, the role of Islam in
international affairs and the political signiﬁcance of the New Right in
America have drawn attention to the relationship between religion and
politics and the possible dangers associated with religious involvement in
public discourse.
The liberal maintains that the governing of human societies must be
with the consent of the governed. For the liberal, theocracy must always
be suspect, because of the fear that the will of God (as interpreted by the
powers that be) will be imposed on those who do not share the faith of the
powers. This fear is warranted historically, and John Rawls, for instance,
makes a great deal of the history of religious persecution, and the turmoil
caused by the wars of religion in Europe as the background to his political
liberalism.7 Robert Audi, in his listing of aspects of religious (as distinct
from secular) reasons in politics includes the following features: ‘infallible
supreme authority’, ‘condemnatory tendencies’, ‘threat of religious
domination’, ‘cults and the spectre of fanaticism’, ‘dangers of an inﬂated
sense of self-importance’, and ‘a passionate concern with outsiders’.8 This
listing speaks for itself in indicating the liberal’s grounds for anxiety.
I. JOHN RAWLS ON PUBLIC REASON
John Rawls dealt with the question of religion and politics in Political
Liberalism, and he revisited the topic in 1997 in the signiﬁcant article,
‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’. Rawls developed his ideas of
Political Liberalism because of his discovery that his notion of Justice as
Fairness, as articulated in A Theory of Justice, effectively advocated what
he came to call a comprehensive moral doctrine. But his basic concern
had been to ﬁnd a way in which people could agree to regulate their
common life despite their radical disagreements about what they would
like to achieve in their lives. He imagined several reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines coexisting in a liberal, pluralist polity, each with its view
of the good life and its notions of justice and truth. The polity is only
possible, however, because each of the adherents of a comprehensive
doctrine exercises restraint, not insisting on her view of the true and the
good, but willing to accept the content of the overlapping consensus
between the reasonable doctrines as a basis for regulating the common
life. Each one will have her own reasons for seeing this content as true and
good, based on her comprehensive doctrine. But the grounds for arguing
in favour of this content with representatives of other reasonable
comprehensive doctrines will not appeal to these reasons, but only to
public reason.
‘I propose that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or
right be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to
citizens as citizens’9. This proposal relies on a two-tiered model. There are
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several reasonable comprehensive doctrines, some of them religious, but
in the liberal polity there is one overlapping consensus which relies on
notions of the politically reasonable rather than on notions of truth. This
two-tiered model seemed to require considerable restraint on the part of
the religiously committed citizen. Only what could belong in the
overlapping consensus might be part of the public discourse between a
representative of a Christian world-view and, for instance, a defender of
secular liberal individualism.10
Rawls called his 1997 essay his ‘most detailed account of why the
constraints of public reason, as manifested in a modern constitutional
democracy based on a liberal political conception y are ones that
holders of both religious and nonreligious comprehensive views can
reasonably endorse’.11 In this essay he presents a structure which is more
complex than the two-tiered model. His driving question in the later
discussion is of interest to us:
Is it possible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic
society who endorse society’s intrinsic political ideals and values and do not
simply acquiesce in the balance of political and social forces?.y How is it
possible – or is it – for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to
endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may
not prosper under it, and indeed may decline?12
Note that he conjoins both secular, i.e., non-religious, reasonable
comprehensive doctrines with religious ones in their relation to the
constitutional regime. That is, he does not consider the constitutional
regime as automatically favouring a secular worldview over against a
religious worldview.
This later model is more complex. It comprises three different layers.13
1) The background culture of civil society.
2) The public, political culture, viewed widely.
3) Public reason: public political culture, viewed narrowly.
The background culture is said to be the culture of civil society. This
has available to it many forms of conversation and argument and various
media through which communication and information-ﬂow take place.
Rawls endorses the need for as open and free a communication as
possible in this background culture, and he quotes David Hollenbach
approvingly to this effect:
Conversation and argument about the common good will not occur initially in
the legislature or in the political sphere (narrowly conceived as the domain in
which interests and power are adjudicated). Rather it will develop freely in
those components of civil society that are the primary bearers of cultural
meaning and value – universities, religious communities, the world of arts, and
serious journalism. It can occur wherever thoughtful men and women bring
their beliefs on the meaning of the good life into intelligent and critical
encounter with understandings of this good held by other peoples with other
PERMISSION TO SPEAK 181
traditions. In short, it occurs wherever education about and serious inquiry into
the meaning of the good life takes place.14
The idea of public reason applies in the public political forum. Rawls
restricts the idea in terms of context, content and persons.15 The context
of public reason is the discussion of the law which is to be enacted and
applied for a democratic people with the coercive backing of the state.
The content of public reason is provided by the family of reasonable
political conceptions of justice upon which people draw in making their
proposals and criticisms in the discussions about coercive law. The people
involved are judges, public ofﬁcials, and candidates for public ofﬁce in
their public capacities.16 Citizens also are included in the requirements of
public reason insofar as they subject their own proposals to the criterion
of reciprocity. This criterion requires of them to make only proposals that
they can expect would be found reasonable by their fellow citizens,
considered as free and equal.17 Compliance with this criterion is part
fulﬁlment of the duty of civility.
Political liberalism requires there to be comprehensive doctrines which
ground for their own adherents the validity of the elements on which
consensus can be attained, even though the reasons for assenting to the
consensus will be different for the various doctrines. Judgments grounded
in a comprehensive doctrine may be true or false; judgments which are
part of the overlapping consensus are said to be reasonable. Citizens who
endorse a reasonable judgment in the overlapping consensus will hold it
to be true or right on the basis of their comprehensive doctrine. ‘It is
central to political liberalism that free and equal citizens afﬁrm both a
comprehensive doctrine and a political conception’.18
While Rawls considers some religious comprehensive doctrines to be
unreasonable, his mature position includes religious comprehensive
doctrines with their appropriate languages as among the reasonable
doctrines which uphold and sustain the overlapping consensus. At the
same time, the content of public reason is not secular; on the contrary,
secular in the sense of deliberately non-religious doctrines are among the
comprehensive doctrines supporting the political conception. It is neither
religious nor secular, but a political conception capable of being accepted
by proponents of both religious and secular comprehensive doctrines.19
In describing the content of public reason Rawls calls it a framework,
and maintains that it contains many possible forms. So there is no single
‘public reason’ but several varieties. Rawls insists that there are many
possible political conceptions of justice and so many forms of public
reason. ‘There are many liberalisms and related views, and therefore
many forms of public reason speciﬁed by a family of reasonable political
conceptions. Of these, justice as fairness, whatever its merits, is but one’.20
Rawls now includes within the family of possible political conceptions
‘Catholic views of the common good and solidarity when they are
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expressed in terms of political values’.21 He also includes Habermas’
discourse conception of legitimacy. Important in this quoted passage is
the qualiﬁcation about expression in terms of political values. Rawls
refers to John Finnis and Jacques Maritain in a footnote, which seems to
suggest that their works achieve such expression. It suggests that the type
of argument in terms of natural law which builds its understanding of
social and legal order on the basis of the dignity of the human person
could offer a candidate for a political conception of justice. This possible
political conception might offer an alternative to Rawls’ own proposed
justice as fairness. Acceptable political conceptions of justice propose
principles which apply to the basic structure of society, which can be
presented independent of any comprehensive doctrine, and which are
grounded in such fundamental ideas as the freedom and equality of
citizens and the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation.
Thus, the content of public reason is given by the principles and values of the
family of liberal political conceptions of justice meeting these conditions. To
engage in public reason is to appeal to one of these political conceptions – to
their ideals and principles, standards and values – when debating fundamen-
tal political questions. This requirement still allows us to introduce into
political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or
nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to
support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to
support.22
Far from excluding religious considerations, Rawls here seems to allow
for religious considerations to be part of political debate, with the proviso
that if any policy or legal measure is being advocated the appropriate
public reasons be provided at some later date. Religious reasons are not
being excluded; but only those religious reasons may be advanced
in support of political proposals which are capable of being translated
into public reasons in the strict sense. The reference to the perspective of
the common good suggests that this language is capable of such
translation, even if it is associated with a particular religious compre-
hensive doctrine.
This tolerance for religious and secular reasons in public discourse
characterizes what Rawls terms the wide view of public political culture.
The proviso, the injunction to present proper political reasons in due
course, protects public reason, and marks off public political culture from
the background culture of civil society.23 But Rawls also emphasizes that
there are positive reasons for introducing comprehensive doctrines into
public political discussion. That citizens would have knowledge and
understanding of each other’s comprehensive doctrines strengthens the
viability of an overlapping consensus, since proposals made in public
reason for legislative measures will respect the reasons that others will
have for supporting or rejecting the proposals. Once again Rawls cites
with agreement David Hollenbach in advocating the desirability of
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conversation and argument about visions of the good life espoused by
different religious groups.24
It might be thought an exaggeration to see the narrow and the wide
views of public political culture as two tiers of a three-tiered structure. But
the following considerations support the proposal. Public political culture
in the narrow sense is conﬁned to the use of argument by a limited
number of people acting in ofﬁcial capacities within rather narrowly
deﬁned roles. Public reason, as Rawls has introduced it, is restricted in
this double sense. But at the same time, civil society embraces many areas
of engagement in which people associate only or at least primarily with
those who share their religion, their values, their convictions or their
interests. The background culture as Rawls has characterized it can be
very tolerant, in allowing diverse groups to coexist, but such groups do
not necessarily interact. The interaction which takes place in public
reason can only lead to the formation of overlapping consensus if there is
some other arena in which citizens and groups can interact in a process of
dialogue and deliberation. Rawls’ idea of the wide view of public political
culture seems to be an acknowledgement of the need for a bridge between
public reason in the narrow sense, and the range of comprehensive
doctrines in the background culture. The need is for a forum of some kind
which mediates between, and overlaps, both the private domains of civil
society and the arena of public reason. In practice, in our experience in
pluralist societies with liberal polities, this forum is provided in a ﬂuid
way by the media, educational institutions, and cultural and religious
groups including churches, which contribute to fostering the relevant
encounter. The development from the two-tiered model is perhaps a case
of Rawls adjusting his theory to take account of political practice.
Rawls’ discussion of public reasons suggests that religious arguments
do not have to remain conﬁned to the non-public realms of civil society.
Believers, speaking from their faith convictions, do not have to be on the
defensive within liberal political communities. His acknowledgement of
the richness of their intellectual heritage, for instance, is an invitation to
Catholics to make a more vocal contribution to public life. However, the
condition under which such contribution is welcome is that citizens of
faith continue to abide by reasonable norms of argument and reasonable
standards of participation in public discourse. Rawls has a speciﬁc
meaning for the term ‘reasonable’ in this context:
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system
of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another
fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable
conception of political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even
at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that other
citizens also accept those terms. The criterion of reciprocity requires that when
those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation,
those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept
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them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under
the pressure of an inferior political or social position.25
Is this a satisfactory solution? For instance, can a Catholic citizen who
wishes to contribute to a just social, economic and political order be
content with this permission to speak, under the proviso of conforming to
requirements of public reason? It is a conditional and therefore limited
permission. But is it enough?
David Hollenbach, who is quoted with approval by John Rawls, seems
to think that it provides for all that a Catholic would wish to contribute to
public discourse. Michael J. Perry echoes this approval.26 After all, even
the searching questions which have been addressed to liberalism by its
critics, some of them coming from faith-based communitarian positions,
have not sought to endorse coercive law in the narrow ambit of public
reason. They have instead called into question some of the foundational
premises of liberal theory, especially the conception of the unencumbered
individual, the narrow understanding of rationality, and the perhaps
unintended endorsement of a particular vision of the good life. All of
these discussions could be conducted either in the background culture or
in the wide public political culture.
Similarly, questions about the realist foundations of our social order,
the ultimate possibility of justice beyond our ﬂawed human attempts, the
dialectic between failure and redemption in our difﬁcult social and
political histories, whether our common good is merely constructed and
invented, or whether it can be discovered to be rooted in our ultimate
common good who is God, these questions can be asked and pursued
rigorously in our wide public political culture, without thereby intending
to impose answers, or more speciﬁcally, constitutional arrangements and
coercive laws derived exclusively from those answers on fellow citizens.27
Accordingly, this position developed and articulated by Rawls in his late
work might be satisfactory.
II. CHRISTOPHER EBERLE AND THE THEIST’S DOUBT
Christopher J. Eberle does not think so. His book, Religious Conviction in
Liberal Politics, does not focus exclusively on Rawls, but on what he calls
‘justiﬁcatory liberalism’.28 What distinguishes justiﬁcatory liberalism
from other forms of liberalism, according to Eberle, is ‘commitment to
the following claim: because each citizen ought to respect her
compatriots, each citizen ought to pursue public justiﬁcation for her
favored coercive laws’.29 The requirement of public justiﬁcation is derived
from the duty of respect owed to fellow citizens. Eberle concedes that this
is an umbrella category which covers a variety of positions, each with its
own account of respect and of justiﬁcation. But the positions all agree on
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one thing: ‘justiﬁcatory liberals unanimously agree that a responsible
citizen in a liberal democracy ought not support (or reject) a coercive law
on the basis of religious convictions alone’.30
Eberle explains that there are two requirements expressed in this
common position of justiﬁcatory liberalism. The ﬁrst is the requirement
that those wishing to support or reject a coercive law, very deﬁnitely
within the realm of public reason as Rawls presented it, should pursue
public justiﬁcation for their favoured position. This is the requirement
of pursuit. The second requirement is restraint. That a citizen should
restrain herself from supporting a coercive law for which no public
justiﬁcation is available, or that a citizen should not rely exclusively on
religious grounds for supporting or rejecting a coercive law. An example
of this from another justiﬁcatory liberal is Robert Audi’s proposed two
principles ‘the Principle of Secular Rationale’, and ‘the Principle of
Secular Motivation’. The ﬁrst principle ‘posits a prima facie obligation
not to advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human
conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, adequate secular reason for
this’, and the second principle imposes an ‘obligation to abstainy unless
one is sufﬁciently motivated by normatively adequate secular reason’.31
Audi calls the ﬁrst a minimal justiﬁcation principle while the latter is a
virtue principle.32 In Eberle’s terms they both underline the requirement
of restraint, so that no one would rely only on a religious reason in
supporting a coercive law. They imply the requirement of pursuit.
Eberle argues that the systems of justiﬁcation developed by justiﬁca-
tory liberals are successful in grounding the obligation of pursuit in the
duty of respect. However, he maintains that their efforts at grounding the
obligation of restraint are less successful. The main focus of his work is to
challenge the consensus of justiﬁcatory liberals that the requirement of
restraint is justiﬁed. His thesis is:
a citizen has an obligation sincerely and conscientiously to pursue a widely
convincing secular rationale for her favored coercive laws, but she doesn’t have an
obligation to withhold support from a coercive law for which she lacks a widely
convincing secular rationale.33
In other words, against the liberal consensus he argues that there are
circumstances in which a citizen is morally permitted to endorse a
coercive law even if she only has religious grounds for doing so.
He discusses several liberal positions, but it is his treatment of Rawls
which is particularly useful here. Rawls relies on the device of the original
position, even in his late work. The device remains powerful, even if
Rawls has revised considerably the theory of justice as fairness in which
the construct of the original position ﬁrst played a central role. The
original position is a hypothetical choice situation, in which choosers are
imagined to choose principles to regulate society’s main institutions so
that a just society would be achieved. To ensure that no one will be
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unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged the choosers are described as
choosing behind a veil of ignorance. They are assumed to be without all
that particular information about themselves which might inﬂuence them
to choose in their own favour. They do not know what family or social
class they belong to, for instance. They do not know what their ideal of
the good life is, what their guiding values are, or what profession they
exercise. At the same time they are assumed to have sufﬁcient general
information about psychology and society, economics and politics, to be
able to choose principles for a society. So they are aware of the typical
range of visions of the good life and plans of life in a society, as well as of
the typical socio-economic spread in a population.
Their ignorance of their own particular social position means that the
choosers in the original position will have to calculate on the possibility
that they themselves would end up in the least desirable position in
society. Ascribing to them a very cautious attitude and reluctance to take
risks, Rawls maintained that the choosers would avoid all principles of a
utilitarian nature which would tolerate the pursuit of a greater overall
good for society, and even a greater average utility, that could only be
achieved at the expense of some minority. Any conceivable disadvantages
might turn out to be borne by the choosers, and so they would be very
careful about choosing any principles which would tolerate any unequal
distribution of burdens.
In the early versions of his theory of justice, Rawls used this construct
to generate his two principles of justice. The ﬁrst of these two principles
speciﬁed as large a set of basic liberties for each one as was compatible
with the same liberties for everyone else, and the second allowed for some
inequality in society, but only on the double condition that the
inequalities functioned so as to make the worst-off in society better off
than they would otherwise be, and that the advantaged positions were
open to all under conditions of equal opportunity. The two principles,
Rawls argued, would be chosen by rational choosers behind a veil of
ignorance in the original position, and for this reason would be justiﬁed as
the principles of justice.
The theory was much more complex and nuanced than this brief
summary. It also involved the further steps of the elaboration of a
constitution for the state, the design of legislation, and the guidance of
adjudication, consistent with the two principles. The basic justiﬁcation of
the principles, as what would be chosen in the original position, was
corroborated by two further forms of justiﬁcation, namely, ﬁrst, reﬂective
equilibrium of the two principles with established moral judgments, and
second, success in founding a society which revealed itself as just and
sustainable.
In later writings Rawls continued to rely on the idea of justice as
fairness and on the construct of the original position and the two
principles of justice. However, he presented justice as fairness as a
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political conception of justice which might be part of the overlapping
consensus between reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a constitutional
liberal polity. Some of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines would be
religious world-views, and Rawls expected that their adherents could
subscribe to the political conception of justice in the overlapping consensus,
including the requirement of restraint in relation to public reason.
Eberle revisits the argument about the original position to challenge
Rawls’ assumption that the requirement of restraint is justiﬁed. He asks if
it would be acceptable to the choosers in the original position. Retracing
the steps of Rawls’ argument he proceeds as follows. Behind their veil of
ignorance, the choosers in the original position do not know if they are
theists or not. But from their general knowledge, they know what theists
are, and what they believe. They know, for instance, that theists consider
that their obligation to obey the will of God overrides all their other
possible obligations. Accordingly, they know that if they were to choose
the principle of restraint in the original position, and then subsequently
discover their religious commitment as theists, they would not be able to
sustain the undertaking given in the original position. This is the ‘strains
of commitment’ argument which Rawls relies on in his discussion of the
principle of average utility.34
The question is, given that the parties in the original position might turn out to
be theists, and given that they might take themselves to have an overriding and
totalizing obligation to obey God, can they commit themselves in good faith to
the liberal principle of legitimacy?35
For present purposes we can accept Eberle’s account of Rawls’
principle of legitimacy as entailing the duty of civility which in turn entails
the duty of restraint; and we can also allow his account of how Rawls
proposed his position on this point as subject to the same conditions of
justiﬁcation as the two principles of justice.36 Eberle’s conclusion is that
the choosers could not commit themselves under these conditions, since
they are aware of the strains their commitment might place them under.
The unlikelihood of commitment to Rawls’ principle is increased if there
is available to them a satisfactory alternative for realizing the duty of
civility. Eberle suggests there is such an alternative, which he presents as
‘the ideal of conscientious engagement’.
The ideal of conscientious engagement is formulated in a set of six
constraints which can guide a citizen in the exercise of her duty of respect
for her fellow citizens.
(1) She will pursue a high degree of rational justiﬁcation for the claim that
a favoured coercive policy is morally appropriate.
(2) She will withhold support from a given coercive policy if she can’t
acquire a sufﬁciently high degree of rational justiﬁcation for the claims
that that policy is morally appropriate.
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(3) She will attempt to communicate to her compatriots her reasons for
coercing them.
(4) She will pursue public justiﬁcation for her favoured coercive policies.
(5) She will listen to her compatriots’ evaluation of her reasons for her
favoured coercive policies with the intention of learning from them
about the moral (im)propriety of those policies.
(6) She will not support any policy on the basis of a rationale that denies
the dignity of her compatriots.37
Eberle acknowledges that he is working with two concepts of
justiﬁcation. The public justiﬁcation mentioned in (4) is different from
the rational justiﬁcation of (2), and the difference becomes evident in
those cases in which the favoured coercive policies achieve no public
justiﬁcation. He discusses the difference between the two notions of
justiﬁcation, and draws attention to the danger of assuming that the
provision of public justiﬁcation is a test of rationality. Two factors
contribute to rational justiﬁcation: the manner in which a belief is formed,
and the evidential set available to the person holding the belief. The
manner of belief formation, to be rational, includes a number of
dispositions such as: the willingness to form a belief on the basis of the
best available evidence, to seek out relevant evidence, to subject the belief
to criticism, and to change the belief if the evidence requires that. The
evidential set is that assortment of beliefs and experiences which a citizen
assumes to be true while subjecting the controverted belief to
assessment.38 That a belief is rationally justiﬁed for a citizen does not
imply that the arguments adduced in support of the belief are sound.
‘Soundness has to do with the objective adequacy of an argument for a
given conclusion; rationality has to do with whether some argument
appears to be sound given a citizen’s evidential set and given that she has
gone about evaluating that argument in the appropriate manner’.39
Public justiﬁcation is achieved when a citizen is able to present arguments
for her belief which each one of her compatriots can, or actually does, ﬁnd
compelling. Needless to say, and Eberle admits it, this is a very
demanding requirement.40
The core of Eberle’s criticism of Rawls is a powerful and telling
argument. It exploits a strength of Rawls’ powerful device of the original
position and uses it to endorse the requirement of pursuit while at the
same time to show that the requirement of restraint does not enjoy the
same foundations in the duty of respect.
So are we brought to the position that the citizen of a liberal
democratic polity is not bound to restrain herself from reliance on
exclusively religious reasons when deliberating about coercive law? Must
we agree with Eberle that the religiously committed citizen, once she has
conformed to the constraints of conscientious engagement, but has failed
to discover public justiﬁcation for the favoured coercive measure and has
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not been convinced by counter arguments from fellow citizens, is then
warranted in supporting the proposed measure on religious grounds?
Is Eberle correct in the description of the theist, and speciﬁcally in the
description of the Catholic theist? Is this what Catholics hold about
politics and involvement in public discourse? The contrast with
Hollenbach seems to suggest that it is not a correct description.
III. CATHOLICS: THEISTS AND/OR LIBERALS?
Eberle’s description of the theist merits closer analysis. First of all, he
stresses that the theist resists the liberal’s attempt to transform religious
commitment into privatized preference or lifestyle choice. Theists
typically will resist ‘dividing their lives into a private realm governed by
a set of overriding obligations to God and a public realm in which they
accord their divinely imposed obligations some lesser weight’.41 On the
contrary, and second, theists will regard their obligations to obey God as
overriding and totalizing. Martin Luther King is quoted from the context
of the opposition to racial segregation:
You have a dual citizenry. You live both in time and eternity. Your highest
loyalty is to God, and not to the mores or the folkways, the state or the nation,
or any man-made institution. If any earthly institution or custom conﬂicts with
God’s will, it is your Christian duty to oppose it. You must never allow the
transitory, evanescent demands of man-made institutions to take precedence
over the eternal demands of the mighty God.42
Critical also for the strains of compliance argument is the fact that the
theist sees her obedience to God as essential for her leading a meaningful
life, and therefore for her moral identity. Obedience to God is taken to
embrace areas of social and political existence as well as what may be
considered private. This is why in the original position the principle
of restraint derived from the duty of respect would be known to be
particularly burdensome to theists.
Eberle wants to insist that this is not just a feature of some extreme
sects, but is a common feature of theism. In his words,
the claim that a theist has an overriding and totalizing obligation to obey God
is hardly the personal property of ‘certain fundamentalist sects’: it is an
ecumenical claim, endorsed by theologically liberal Catholics, Orthodox Jews,
politically liberal evangelicals, Eastern Orthodox Christians, and adherents to
almost any other theistic perspective.
He concedes that there may be disagreements about the content, the
sources and the language of the obligation, but ‘one thing they are
unlikely to disagree about is the overridingness of their obligation to obey
God’.43
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Eberle’s argument relies on the view that the theist recognizes an
overriding and totalizing obligation to obey God. This premise in the
argument is only relevant to the conclusion, however, if it is also assumed,
ﬁrst, that God may command something which would require of the
believer that fellow citizens be coerced so that God’s will may be done,
and second, that there are instances in which no public justiﬁcation would
be available for that which God commands. Both of these assumptions
seem contrary to Catholic sensibilities, so we should query Eberle’s
inclusion of Catholics in his category of theists so understood.
The traditional Catholic reliance on natural law reveals the expectation
of the coherence of the moral with the metaphysical. Natural law is
understood as God’s law in the human itself. As created, human nature has
an exigency and a teleology, and these reveal God’s will for his creature, as
imprinted in what he has made. God’s will for his creature, as revealed
through scriptures and Church teaching, cannot be inconsistent withGod’s
will for his creature, as revealed through the creature’s created nature. At
the same time, for those matters in social and political existence for which
coercion is required, the Catholic tradition conveys a conﬁdence that
appropriately non-religious arguments can be found. A classic example is
Aquinas’ discussion of the natural law bases of civil law, and the question
whether the civil law ought to command or prohibit all that natural law
commands or prohibits. For Aquinas, whether or not some activity,
known to be immoral, should be prohibited in the civil law, depends on the
impact that activity has on society. So hemaintains that certain actions like
murder and theft could not be tolerated, not because of their wrongfulness,
but because they would make social existence impossible.44 What is
necessary for the security and survival of society is a matter of practical
judgment and can be deliberated upon without any reference to revelation.
Catholic tradition has developed a sophisticated position concerning
the impact of moral teaching on political and legal order. This position is
summarized neatly in the quotation from Rawls, given above, in which he
refers to the document on religious liberty from the Second Vatican
Council. In its Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae,
the Vatican Council insisted that no one should be coerced in matters
of religious belief and practice. This teaching marked a signiﬁcant
development from the previously accepted position in the Church,
according to which error had no rights, and that the good state was one in
which Catholic moral norms were enforced in civil law. While
abandoning neither the claims of the Church to truth, nor the assertion
of the duty of all to seek the truth and the true Church, the Council
acknowledged that even an erroneous conscience possessed dignity and
ought to be respected.
Freedom of this kind means that all should be immune from coercion on the
part of individuals, social group and every human power so that, within due
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limits, nobody is forced to act against his convictions nor is anyone to be
restrained from acting in accordance with his convictions in religious matters in
private or in public, alone or in association with others.45
This principle of religious liberty has been applied in the Church to the
question of the appropriate attitude of the state to moral matters.46 This
is the signiﬁcant area in which Catholics have been faced with the
question whether they are required by their faith commitment to coerce
fellow citizens into abstaining from activity which Catholics hold to be
immoral. Transposed from the arena of religious freedom to that of
morality, the principle requires that state law on moral matters should
not coerce anyone to act against their conscience, nor should the law
prevent anyone from following their conscience, within due limits. This
applies even in cases in which one might rightly hold the view that people
were acting immorally. Note that the due limits refer to those
requirements mentioned by Aquinas as necessary for the existence of
society.
Various local Churches have had to translate this new thinking into
practical political stances in their own contexts.47 It is interesting to
review the history of the Irish Catholic Church from the past twenty-ﬁve
years or so, as it has sought to adopt a new position in public life. A series
of legislative issues from contraception and divorce to abortion raised the
issue of whether Catholic voters were required by their Church to support
measures which fellow citizens would view as coercive. Discussions
concerning the future of Northern Ireland also drew from the Catholic
Church a statement of its view of its own role in society and state. In
addressing these issues, the Church insisted that it does not conclude from
the fact that an action is immoral that it should be prohibited in law. It
recognized that the political community has its own legitimate interest in
public morality, education, the family, etc. in so far as these are elements
of, and contribute to, public order. Legislators and citizens have
responsibility for that order. It was precisely in the terms of concerns
appropriate to legislators and the state, given their responsibilities, and
therefore in terms of public justiﬁcation, that Catholic Bishops offered
their opinion on what was good for the country. In the face of
misunderstanding and misrepresentation they clariﬁed their position:
Those who insist on seeing the issue purely in terms of the State enforcing
Catholic moral teaching, are therefore missing the point. ... What the legislators
have to decide is whether a change in the law would, on balance, do more harm
than good, by damaging the character of the society for which they are
responsible.48
It must be admitted that the Catholic Church has been slow to
recognize the value of liberalism and human rights. But history shows
that the Church has been learning about how to be a good citizen in a
liberal polity. This learning has fed in to its teaching. Being a good citizen
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is to take responsibility for public order and for the quality of political
existence. This means supporting candidates whom one judges will serve
and promote the common good, and it means supporting policies which
will promote public order. A clear example was the proposal, twice put
before the Irish electorate in a referendum, to remove the constitutional
ban on divorce legislation. The Catholic Bishops formulated their
position clearly. They did not argue in terms of the nature of marriage or
of marriage vows, they did not argue from authority, and they explicitly
ruled out a deduction from the wrongness of divorce on the moral level to
its inappropriateness as a legal measure. Instead they based all their
arguments on practical experience and on estimations of the likely
consequences of changes in the law.49 They were aware of the differences
in the interpretation of experience among serious and responsible
commentators, and they were aware of the inconclusive nature of all
prognoses. In other words, they participated in the public discussion
within the terms of public reason. To be emphasized here, however, is that
they did not interpret their restraint as a limitation imposed by an
inhospitable liberal polity. Rather, it was on their view the appropriate
form of participation, given their theological understanding of the role of
the Church in the political realm.
This review of Church teaching from the Second Vatican Council and
of Church practice in concrete cases indicates that the Catholic Church
commits itself to restraint when it comes to those matters of public reason
in Rawls’ sense in which citizens have to take a stance on questions which
involve law backed by coercion. I suggest, therefore, that the Catholic
cannot be listed under the rubric of ‘theist’ as Eberle has attempted to
construct it.
Eberle’s discussion of the original position device from the perspective
of the theist reveals a weakness in Rawls’ justiﬁcation of the requirement
of restraint, even if not one sufﬁciently fatal to undermine the
conclusions. Perhaps that weakness is rooted in Rawls’ reliance on the
model of the rationality of the individual pursuing her interests. That
model of rationality is common to liberal positions. The discussion of the
issue of restraint, relying on a distinction between the common good and
public order, rather than on the interests of individuals, might be better
able to deal with Eberle’s challenge.
On the traditional Thomist and Aristotelian understanding, those with
authority in the state held responsibility for the common good.
Traditionally, the ‘common good’ was understood to include the
complete ﬂourishing of every human being. And since moral integrity is
an element of complete ﬂourishing; therefore the concern for the common
good would require of the state to see to it that its citizens achieve
complete ﬂourishing including moral uprightness. This echoes Aristotle’s
dictum that the political community has concern for the goodness of its
citizens, and this distinguishes it from other forms of association such as
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mutual non-aggression pacts, or contracts for the supply of goods and
services.50 The development in the Church’s position in relation to liberty
required a reﬁnement also in this view of the duty of the state with regard
to the common good. The implication of the new understanding is that
although the state does have its own interest in the ﬂourishing of
individuals as part of its responsibility, this is not to be understood as an
unrestricted interest. The state’s interest is not in the ‘common good’ in
the full sense, but in ‘public order’, that dimension of the common good
which is of particular relevance to the well-being of society, and which it is
able to affect through its appropriate instruments, including coercive law.
In conclusion, it would seem that Rawls’ understanding of public
reason, coupled with his recognition of the related roles of the
background culture and the wide view of public political culture is
hospitable to the kind of public participation which Catholic citizens at
least might wish to make. The challenge to this position presented by
Christopher Eberle on behalf of theists, while revealing an interesting
weakness in Rawls’ theory – already identiﬁed by other commentators in
other ways – does not succeed. The distinctive position of the Catholic
Church which is the outcome of a process of learning, enables it both to
support a political conception in the overlapping consensus on the basis
of its comprehensive doctrine, and to participate in the discourse in public
political culture, understood both widely and narrowly. Perhaps what
this discussion most interestingly reveals is the way in which religious
traditions have very different understandings of their relationship to the
realm of politics.
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